An Approach to Intellectual Property, Bankruptcy, and Corporate Control by Kieff, F. Scott & Paredes, Troy A.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 82 Issue 4 
2004 
An Approach to Intellectual Property, Bankruptcy, and Corporate 
Control 
F. Scott Kieff 
Washington University School of Law 
Troy A. Paredes 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
F. Scott Kieff and Troy A. Paredes, An Approach to Intellectual Property, Bankruptcy, and Corporate 
Control, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 1313 (2004). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/3 
This F. Hodge O'Neal Corporate and Securities Law Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the 
Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington 
University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more 
information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1313 
 
 
AN APPROACH TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 
BANKRUPTCY, AND CORPORATE CONTROL  
F. SCOTT KIEFF & TROY A. PAREDES* 
ABSTRACT 
Corporate control is the central concern of corporate law, and, in 
addition to priority, has become a core concern of bankruptcy. The 
question of corporate control in bankruptcy is especially important for 
intellectual property (“IP”) rights. Bankruptcy proceedings do not 
compromise fundamentally the value of most tangible assets. Tangible 
assets generally retain their value both during and after bankruptcy 
proceedings, although there is always the risk that the business will be run 
poorly. IP is different. IP rights are typically most valuable when they 
carry a credible threat of injunction. As a result, to the extent the delay 
and coordination problems of bankruptcy lead to the under-enforcement of 
a debtor’s IP rights–or simply to the impression of under-enforcement–
bankruptcy can frustrate the important coordination benefits IP rights 
otherwise serve. The bankruptcy process itself potentially can erode the 
private value of IP to a firm and all of its constituencies, as well as the 
public value of IP in facilitating downstream commercialization of the 
subject matter IP otherwise protects. To ensure that a debtor’s IP rights 
are enforced vigorously in bankruptcy, a party with the right incentives, 
information, and resources, as well as with standing to sue, must have 
control over IP assets in bankruptcy.  
A prepackaged bankruptcy or an assignment of a debtor’s IP assets for 
the benefit of its creditors might mitigate the delay and coordination 
problems of bankruptcy. Borrowing from structured finance, we explore a 
different option: the creation of a bankruptcy-remote special purpose 
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& Rita Ricardo-Campbell National Fellowships and Robert Eckles Swain National Fellowships at 
Stanford University’s Hoover Institution and from the 2003–2004 Israel Treiman Faculty Research 
Fellowship at Washington University School of Law. Paredes is an Associate Professor of Law at 
Washington University School of Law. The authors gratefully acknowledge intellectual contributions 
from participants in the 2004 F. Hodge O’Neal Corporate and Securities Law Symposium, which was 
co-sponsored by the Washington University School of Law and the Weidenbaum Center on the 
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entity (“SPE”) to which a company transfers all or part of its IP assets to 
ensure that the assets do not become part of the company’s bankruptcy 
estate when and if the company is ever in bankruptcy. A properly 
structured “IP SPE” would have the critical attribute that a holder of IP 
must have to ensure the value of the IP: the credible perception by all 
market players that the SPE can enjoin infringers of, as well as transact 
over, the IP. The sort of “IP securitization” that we outline is very similar 
in structure to a traditional asset securitization.  
One of the principal normative criticisms of the IP securitization 
structure, as we propose it, is that the structure might accelerate what 
some might see as the death of legal liability by removing assets from the 
reach of a debtor’s creditors in bankruptcy. Accordingly, in addition to 
outlining the IP securitization structure, this Essay briefly explores how 
the death of legal liability may be exaggerated and how concerns over the 
death of legal liability may be overstated. More to the point, in some 
instances, IP securitization may best ensure the value of IP assets to the 
benefit of a debtor’s creditors and other constituencies.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate control—how authority over the corporation and its assets is 
allocated among various corporate constituencies–is the central concern of 
corporate law. In addition to the issue of priority, corporate control also 
has become a core concern of bankruptcy law, particularly when it comes 
to corporate reorganizations under Chapter 11.1 As Professors Baird and 
 1. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. 
REV. 673 (2003) [hereinafter Baird & Rasmussen, Chapter 11]; Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/3
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Rasmussen have noted: “Investors care intensely about ensuring that 
control of a firm’s assets reside in able hands in good times; they care 
even more in bad times. When a firm is in financial distress, a large part of 
its value can be lost in a short period of time.”2 When allocating control 
over a firm, the challenge is to identify and give control to those who have 
an incentive to maximize the firm’s value as a going concern, or at least to 
maximize the recovery upon a sale of assets. This is no easy task, as 
Professor LoPucki has stressed, because it may be difficult to identify a 
clear residual claimant when a company is bankrupt.3 Arguments have 
been made for placing control over a debtor and its assets in the hands of 
any number of constituencies, including management, shareholders, 
secured creditors, general unsecured creditors, debtor-in-possession 
lenders, and the bankruptcy judge. Instead of picking any single 
constituency to control the firm, different interests could share control, 
either as a matter of law or simply as a matter of bankrtupcy practice. 
However, sharing control brings its own costs. As more parties have a say 
over a debtor and the use or disposition of its assets, delay, coordination 
problems, and other transaction costs can increase substantially.  
The question of control rights in bankruptcy is especially important 
when it comes to intellectual property (“IP”) rights. Bankrtupcy 
proceedings do not compromise fundamentally the value of most tangible 
assets. Tangible assets generally retain their value both during and after 
bankruptcy proceedings, although there is always the risk that the business 
will be run poorly. IP is different. IP rights are typically most valuable 
when they carry a credible threat of injunction.4 However, as a result of 
the delay and coordination problems inherent in the bankruptcy system, a 
Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights, and the Conceptual Foundations of Corporate 
Reorganizations, 87 VA. L. REV. 921, 922 (2001) [hereinafter Baird & Rasmussen, Control Rights]; 
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751 (2002) 
[hereinafter Baird & Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy]; Lynn M. LoPucki, The Nature of the 
Bankrupt Firm: A Response to Baird and Rasmussen’s The End of Bankruptcy, 56 STAN. L. REV. 645 
(2003); Robert K. Rasmussen, Secured Credit, Control Rights and Options, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1935 (2004); David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in Chapter 
11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917 (2003); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 
82 TEX. L. REV. 795 (2004). 
 2. Baird & Rasmussen, Control Rights, supra note 1, at 922. 
 3. See Lynn LoPucki, The Myth of the Residual Owner: An Empirical Study, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 
1341 (2004). 
 4. IP rights also have some value that, at least on first glance, appears to be distinct from the 
right to exclude. For example, IP rights may generate licensing revenues or royalty damages. As 
another example, recent work by Clarisa Long has identified important signaling value of IP rights. 
Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (2002). But this value exists against the 
backdrop of the present patent regime in which patents are enforceable with injunctions. For more on 
the role of the right to exclude in IP, see infra Part II. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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debtor’s IP rights may be under-enforced against infringers, even if the 
debtor-in-possession or trustee-in-bankruptcy has the proper incentive to 
pursue actively the enforcement of the debtor’s IP rights in bankruptcy. 
Further, there is some risk that a major transaction over the debtor’s IP 
could fail to occur in bankruptcy. Consequently, the bankruptcy process 
itself potentially can eliminate all, or at least a substantial portion, of the 
value of IP rights.  
To ensure that a debtor’s IP rights are enforced vigorously, a party with 
the right incentives, information, and resources, as well as with standing to 
sue, needs control over IP assets in bankruptcy. Some might suggest that 
modern bankruptcy practice already has become, or is increasingly 
becoming, sufficiently streamlined so that the delay and coordination 
problems of the bankruptcy process do not present serious concerns for the 
enforcement of IP rights. However, the extent of the impact that such 
procedural improvements might have on ensuring the value of IP rights in 
bankruptcy is debatable.  
Two possible options for addressing bankruptcy delay and coordination 
problems are prepackaged bankruptcies and assignments for the benefit of 
creditors. We offer another choice: the creation of a separate bankruptcy-
remote special purpose entity (“SPE”). Along the lines of a traditional 
securitization of receivables, we explain how a company could attempt to 
keep its IP assets from ever entering its bankruptcy estate by, at an earlier 
stage in the company’s life cycle, selling its IP assets to an SPE. The SPE 
would exercise control over the IP assets, including having the authority to 
seek injunctions against infringers. By keeping a debtor’s IP assets out of 
what would become its bankruptcy estate, the SPE structure would 
mitigate the delay and coordination problems of bankruptcy, thereby 
preserving the value of the IP. A properly structured SPE will have the 
critical attribute that a holder of IP must have to ensure the value of the IP: 
the credible perception by all market players that the SPE can enjoin 
infringers of the IP and can transact over it.  
One of the most important concerns that the IP securitization structure 
raises is rooted in the corporate form and the limited liability of 
shareholders. Some observers have worried that the combination of 
limited shareholder liability and so-called “judgment-proofing” 
transactions–such as a plain vanilla securitization of receivables or, by 
extension, an IP securitization—will spell the unfortunate demise of legal 
liability. We explore why the news of the demise of legal liability might 
be overstated, and so too may be its impact. In short, the costs of greater 
legal protection for creditors may outweigh its benefits. Moreover, when it 
comes to IP assets in particular, in many instances, an IP securitization is 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/3
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likely to increase the size of the corporate pie available to all corporate 
constituencies, even though the IP assets have been transferred to a 
bankruptcy-remote SPE. At a more general level, the greater certainty and 
predictability that arises when the legal system allows parties to privately 
order their affairs can encourage market entry and contracting in the first 
place, by both entrepreneurs and financiers.  
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part II explores the role IP plays in 
commercialization in general and the interface between IP and bankruptcy 
in particular. Part II also discusses the IP securitization structure. Part III 
considers the potential death of legal liability and its implications for IP 
securitization or other judgment-proofing structures that are said to 
remove valuable assets from a debtor’s bankruptcy estate. Part IV 
concludes.  
II. IP AND COMMERCIALIZATION 
The public benefits from IP when IP operates to increase access to the 
subject matter it protects by facilitating commercialization.5 IP rights 
facilitate commercialization by helping the many complementary users of 
the subject matter IP protects coordinate with each other in bringing the 
subject matter to market. Coordination is facilitated in this way when IP 
rights are enforced by property rules (i.e., when IP rights are backed by the 
credible threat of an injunction and enhanced damages for willful 
infringement).  
When IP rights serve their coordination function, they facilitate market 
entry by new businesses and promote transactions over IP. However, the 
coordination function of IP rights can be undercut if a holder of IP enters 
bankruptcy. To be sure, bankruptcy protection can promote an important 
economic end in that bankruptcy can facilitate the redeployment of 
resources to higher and better uses by paying off claimants to those assets 
in an orderly fashion and by allowing a debtor the breathing room to 
reorganize as a viable firm. Yet, the uncertainty and delay of a bankruptcy 
proceeding can themselves frustrate business and financial dealings, 
including those involving IP.  
Bankruptcy law generally treats IP as just another asset in the debtor’s 
bankruptcy estate.6 However, the particular features of IP that distinguish 
 5. See generally F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing 
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001).  
 6. There are some exceptions in which IP is treated differently. For example, § 365(n) of the 
Bankruptcy Code allows a licensee of IP assets to continue to operate under its license despite its 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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it from other forms of property, such as factories, equipment, and real 
estate, raise some potentially serious problems for the IP/bankruptcy 
interface. Most tangible assets have ongoing value both during and after 
bankruptcy proceedings. IP rights may not. The general approach to 
bankruptcy, designed with non-IP assets in mind, purposely alters control 
over the assets of the bankruptcy estate in at least two important ways: 
first, more stakeholders have a greater degree of formal, or at least de 
facto, control over the debtor and the use of the debtor’s assets than occurs 
outside bankruptcy; and second, decision making is often slowed down in 
bankruptcy, at least with respect to significant matters. While collective 
choice and delay, in many instances, can allow for a fairer distribution or a 
more effective reorganization of a debtor’s assets, collective choice and 
delay turn out to present unique risks for IP assets as compared to most 
business assets.7 More to the point, because the value of IP rights is so 
closely tied to the extent to which they carry a present credible threat of 
injunction against others for infringement, the delay and coordination 
problems of bankruptcy can reduce materially both the private and public 
value of IP rights, perhaps toward zero.  
Several tools may be available to prevent the value of IP rights from 
being dissipated through the bankruptcy process; but one tool often 
overlooked is a bankruptcy-remote special purpose entity.8  
A. Property Rights in IP Facilitate Commercialization 
Although several major theories have been offered for how IP rights 
should operate, this Essay focuses on the commercialization theory of IP 
because it is one theory that focuses on a goal that IP actually can achieve 
effectively and efficiently. Many of the ideas that follow have been 
discussed at length elsewhere, so we can be brief here.  
The incentive-based, or reward, theory of IP sees IP as a form of 
positive inducement for a particular behavior, such as the creation of the 
subject matter protected by IP.9 There are several shortcomings to this 
licensor’s bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2000). This statute overrules Lubrizol Enterprises v. 
Richmond Metal Finishers, 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985).  
 7. See infra Part II.B.1. It very well may be the case that the securitization structure we describe 
would be appropriate for certain non-IP assets, such as perishables or goods that are particularly 
fashionable and that may have a short “shelf-life.” Our focus in this Essay, though, is IP. 
 8. For a general discussion of bankruptcy-remote SPEs, see infra Part II.B.2.  
 9. See, e.g., DONALD S. CHISUM, CRAIG ALLEN NARD, HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PAULINE 
NEWMAN & F. SCOTT KIEFF, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 70–72 (2001) (reviewing various incentive-
based theories of IP in the context of patents).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/3
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theory. First, because much of the desired activity occurs without reward, 
rewards may not be needed. Second, because much of the desired activity 
might not be responsive to additional reward, rewards may not be 
effective. Third, IP law is not adaptable to being finely tuned to create 
optimal incentives because of difficulties in determining the appropriate 
reward. Finally, the reward theory fails to explain much of the positive IP 
law framework.10 
The prospect, or rent-dissipation, theory sees IP as a tool for 
coordinating among competing users of the subject matter protected by IP 
in order to avoid rent dissipation by the users as they race to develop or 
deploy the subject matter.11 There are several shortcomings to this theory 
as well. First, rent dissipation itself may not be a problem for IP. A 
number of factors other than IP, such as risk aversion and opportunity 
cost, may mitigate rent dissipation.12 Further, unlike racing for a single 
prize, racing to invent often yields multiple solutions, and the existence of 
a range of goods, services, and processes to choose from is itself 
beneficial. Second, IP rights are likely to be ineffective in mitigating any 
net rent dissipation that does occur because the stronger the IP right is in 
coordinating to prevent downstream rent dissipation, the more valuable the 
grant of an IP right is, which would increase the rent dissipation effect 
among those upstream who are racing for that right. Third, as with the 
reward theory, the prospect theory fails to explain much of the positive 
law IP framework.13  
In contrast to the reward and prospect theories, the commercialization 
theory of IP explains the positive law IP framework, and is tied to a goal 
that is desirable and that can be achieved effectively and efficiently.14 IP 
law facilitates commercialization by forcing parties to negotiate with each 
other under the threat of suits for infringement.15 That is, the IP right 
serves as a focal point, or beacon, for coordination among the many 
 10. For more on limitations of the reward theory, see Kieff, supra note 5, at 705–17.  
 11. See, e.g., Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. 
REV. 305, 305–10 (1992); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & 
ECON. 265, 265–67 (1977) (citing Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. & 
STAT. 348 (1968)).  
 12. See generally Michael B. Abramowicz, Copyright Redundancy (Geo. Mason Law & Econ. 
Research Paper No. 03-03, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=374580 (showing how a 
variety of factors might mitigate rent dissipation effects).  
 13. For more on limitations of the prospect theory, see F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering 
Patents and the Law and Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55, 61–70 
(2003).  
 14. See Kieff, supra note 5 (discussing positive law rules for enforcing patents); Kieff, supra 
note 13 (discussing positive law rules for obtaining patents).  
 15. See generally Kieff, supra note 5, at 727–32. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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complementary users of the subject matter it protects, such as inventors, 
financiers, employees, managers, and marketers. This, in turn, facilitates 
the downstream commercialization of the subject matter IP protects.16 
For IP rights best to facilitate coordination, the rights must be recorded 
publicly, must be capable of being the subject of diverse transactions for 
sale and license, and must be enforced by property rules. Centralized 
public recordation, such as through the patent, trademark, and copyright 
offices, decreases information costs for third parties as well as for all those 
engaged in the commercialization process.17 The availability of diverse 
transactions for sale and license gives those engaged in the 
commercialization process the incentive and ability to push output toward 
full competitive levels through their particularized arrangements.18  
Most importantly, IP rights must be enforced by property rules, as 
distinct from liability rules. To put it more concretely, IP rights must be 
treated as an absolute right to exclude backed by the remedies of 
injunction and the potential for enhanced damages in cases of willful 
infringement.19 As recognized by Professors Haddock, McChesney, and 
Speigel, the threat of a potential onslaught of infringements induced by a 
liability rule can discourage investments in the subject matter covered by 
IP rights ex ante.20 Liability-rule treatment can also undercut contracting 
among holders of IP rights and potential licensees as potential licensees 
attempt to grab IP rights instead of contracting for them. Consequently, 
property rules are particularly important because of their impact on each 
potential infringer in reducing the incentive to infringe, in addition to the 
compensation property rules might confer on the holder of IP rights.21  
Like all markets, markets for IP are imperfect. Because some 
breakdowns will occur, some liability-rule treatment of IP rights will be 
warranted.22 Indeed, the limited liability rooted in corporate law and 
bankruptcy law, when combined with the transaction costs of civil 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Kieff, supra note 13.  
 18. F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, The Basics Matter: At the Periphery of Intellectual 
Property, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 174, 180 (2004) (citing Kieff, supra note 5, at 727 (discussing 
interest of property owners in pushing output to competitive levels)).  
 19. See Kieff, supra note 5, at 732 (discussing property-rule treatment).  
 20. Id. at 733 (citing David Haddock et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary 
Legal Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (1990)).  
 21. Id. at 734 (citing Haddock et al., supra note 20, at 13).  
 22. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing 
Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. 
L. REV. 985, 986–89 (1999).  
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procedure, create some degree of liability-rule treatment for IP rights.23 
Shareholders, managers, and employees, for example, may individually 
benefit while their company infringes another’s IP rights without any fear 
of personal liability given the costs and delays of civil litigation, the 
limited shareholder liability of the corporate form, and the protection 
afforded by the bankruptcy process.  
Although each potential infringer enjoys liability-rule treatment to an 
extent, otherwise treating IP as property rights enforced by property rules 
facilitates the private ordering that is needed for coordination, and 
accordingly commercialization, to occur.  
B. IP in Bankruptcy 
Bankruptcy raises a central problem for IP that it does not raise in the 
same way and to the same degree for other assets, such as land, 
equipment, factories, or most other tangible assets. IP rights dissipate over 
time, and, when in force, their core private and social value is tied to the 
certainty of the IP holder’s right to exclude. Bankruptcy proceedings 
operate relatively slowly, collectivize control, and inject uncertainty. Each 
of these features of bankruptcy threatens to eliminate, or at least materially 
reduce, the value of an IP asset. 
1. Bankruptcy: Delay, Collective Choice, and Uncertainty 
Bankruptcy proceedings begin with the filing of a petition.24 Filing for 
bankruptcy creates the debtor’s bankruptcy “estate,”25 which essentially 
includes the debtor’s property.26 The bankruptcy filing also triggers a 
powerful legal injunction called the “automatic stay,”27 which essentially 
stops any effort by creditors to remove assets from the debtor’s estate. 
Further, there are at least some limits on the authority of the debtor-in-
possession or trustee-in-bankrtupcy to exercise discretion over the debtor, 
particularly when it comes to making decisions outside the ordinary course 
of the debtor’s business. This is not to say that assets cannot be removed 
 23. See Kieff, supra note 5, at 734–36.  
 24. 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303 (2000). 
 25. 11 U.S.C. § 541. 
 26. In Chapter 11 reorganization cases, the debtor often remains in possession of the estate, but 
the bankruptcy trustee may take control. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107, 1108. In Chapter 7 liquidation cases, 
the trustee winds up the estate. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–04. The problems this Essay explores are 
particularly germane to reorganizations and so they will be the focus of the discussion.  
 27. 11 U.S.C. § 362. 
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from the debtor’s bankruptcy estate or that non-ordinary course dealings 
cannot occur. It is to say, though, that efforts to engage in such 
transactions are shunted through the bankruptcy process. As a result, the 
bankruptcy process, most notably by giving the bankruptcy court and a 
debtor’s creditors and counterparties a seat at the table and, accordingly, 
influence over corporate decision making, injects delay, collectivization of 
control, and uncertainty in the way some assets of the estate will be used 
while the bankruptcy proceeding is pending. This can raise serious 
problems for IP assets, whose value is tied to the present credible threat of 
an injunction.  
Delay alone can be a problem because IP rights can dissipate over time. 
Because trademark rights persist only so long as they are used consistently 
in commerce to embody goodwill, lack of use (or even different use of a 
mark) for whatever reason can destroy the particular mark. Similarly, 
while patents and copyrights enjoy a definite term by default—an average 
of 17 years from issuance for patents28 and almost 100 years for 
copyrights—an infringer could point to the non-enforcement by an IP 
holder of its patents or copyrights in relying on the doctrines of laches, 
implied license, and estoppel as a valid defense to a claim of 
infringement.29 In other words, the doctrines of laches, implied license, 
and estoppel, all of which are available to an infringer when an IP holder 
has failed for one reason or another to enforce its IP rights, can have the 
same effect as granting a free license to all infringers.  
Collectivization of control over IP rights is problematic because it can 
create a tragedy of the commons in which the failure of any party with 
influence over corporate decision making in bankruptcy to accede readily 
to efforts to exclude infringers or engage in transactions can frustrate the 
enforcement of IP and the commercialization of the subject matter it 
covers.30 For these same reasons, a central lesson for IP transactions in 
general is that ownership should, if at all possible, be concentrated in a 
single party from the time the IP asset is created and throughout its 
existence.  
Finally, uncertainty is a problem for IP because uncertainty in 
enforcement can effectively transform property-rule protection for IP 
 28. By statute, patents expire after 17 years on average (20 years from filing, and examination 
takes three years on average). For a brief discussion of the change from a 17- to a 20-year patent term, 
see CHISUM ET AL., supra note 9, at 898–900. 
 29. See, e.g., id., at 1118–42. 
 30. Kieff, supra note 5, at 735 (noting that for IP assets, co-ownership can create a tragedy of the 
commons because ownership in the asset only confers a right to exclude, not use) (citing ROBERT 
PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1228–36 (2d ed. 1997)).  
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rights into liability-rule protection.31 Yet, as discussed above, property-
rule treatment is key to facilitating coordination.32  
We recognize that more needs to be known about the extent to which 
the problems discussed above are not only problems in theory but 
problems that actually occur in the real world. Informal observations of 
practitioners reveal that while some lawyers and their clients spend 
substantial resources structuring IP transactions around the types of 
bankruptcy concerns described above, others do not. In other words, even 
if the costs that bankruptcy poses for IP are not large on the whole, they do 
exist and are thus relevant to any consideration of the implications of 
bankruptcy for IP assets. To gain a richer understanding of the nature and 
extent of the problems bankruptcy poses for IP, it would be worth studying 
empirically specific disputes and transactions. For example, it would be 
helpful to understand better the extent to which bankruptcy increases 
infringement of debtors’ IP rights. Better information regarding how often, 
and under what circumstances, a debtor-in-possession or trustee-in-
bankruptcy actually fails to bring and aggressively pursue infringement 
actions also would be useful. Relatedly, one could explore which 
corporate constituencies of a debtor instigate the bringing of infringement 
actions and how other constituencies react when an infringement action is 
urged. In particular, it would be useful to know more about the precise 
mechanisms by which efforts to enforce or transact over an IP asset that is 
part of a bankruptcy estate actually occur, including how such efforts are 
mounted and by what parties, how other constituencies respond and why, 
and what specific factors influence how these efforts play out.33 Further, it 
is important to have more systematic data regarding how often the 
defenses of laches, estoppel, and implied license are asserted by an alleged 
infringer against an IP right that has been tied up as part of a debtor’s 
bankruptcy estate and under what circumstances the defenses are 
successful.34 Finally, one could collect data concerning the extent to which 
parties shy away from entering into licensing arrangements with a debtor 
 31. See Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 22.  
 32. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text.  
 33. Although conversations with practitioners report the problem we explore to loom large in 
many cases, we are confident that in some instances, the problem gets solved. The one often cited 
example of a positive result is that transacting occurred with respect to Marvel Entertainment’s IP 
assets during bankruptcy. See, e.g., Gil Lahav, Licensing to the Rescue, IP L. & BUS., Feb. 2004, at 14.  
 34. One reason these defenses might not work is that courts might be less sympathetic to 
equitable defenses offered by infringers who have intentionally infringed. See, e.g., Hermès Int’l v. 
Lederer De Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding no laches in a counterfeiting 
case). 
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in bankruptcy or even with a company that is not yet bankrupt but that is 
financially distressed.  
The bankruptcy system has evolved methods for facilitating ongoing IP 
transactions as the debtor’s business either wraps up or reorganizes in 
bankruptcy.35 For example, the basic strategy the bankruptcy system has 
adopted for executory contracts, like IP licenses, is to allow the debtor-in-
possession or bankruptcy trustee to elect whether to accept, reject, or 
assign the contract.36 Bankruptcy law then protects the debtor’s licensee by 
giving the debtor’s counterparty rights to have the debtor “cure” or 
“provide adequate assurance” that the debtor will cure or perform37 and, in 
extreme cases, by granting motions to compel election38 or to “lift stay.”39 
The Bankruptcy Code also gives some special treatment to IP licensees by 
allowing them to continue to operate under existing license terms when the 
IP owner is in bankruptcy.40 This Essay does not endeavor to enter the 
debates about the particular features of each statutory provision that bears 
on this process. Rather, this Essay addresses a different problem at the 
IP/bankruptcy interface. 
That is, this Essay addresses the central importance to an IP right of the 
credible threat of an injunction. Because the value of an IP right largely is 
tied to the right to exclude, the value of an IP right is eroded unless there is 
a single party having sufficient legal interest, financial resources, and 
decision-making capacity to be a proper plaintiff with standing in a 
lawsuit.41 If such a putative plaintiff does not exist or faces hurdles or 
other disincentives in seeking an injunction against an alleged infringer, 
third parties have a rational incentive to infringe. This can significantly 
reduce the economic value of the IP right, both to the debtor and to any of 
its present licensees, as well as to the public at large to the extent future 
commercialization would be beneficial. The practical, and in some cases 
legal, obstacles of the bankruptcy process may compromise a debtor’s 
ability or inclination to enforce its IP rights strictly. More to the point, the 
bankruptcy proceeding can frustrate the coordinating function of IP rights, 
 35. For a very accessible review in the context of IP, see Kenneth N. Klee, Intellectual Property 
and Bankruptcy, SB37 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 67 (1997); Stuart M. Riback, Intellectual Property Licenses: the 
Impact of Bankruptcy, 576 P.L.I./Pat. 199 (1999).  
 36. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2000).  
 37. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(A). 
 38. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2). 
 39. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). 
 40. See supra note 6. 
 41. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19 (joinder).  
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creating a risk that what would be a common pool resource among all 
claimants on the assets of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate will lose its value.  
2. The Prospect of a Bankruptcy-Remote SPE 
One solution is to create a bankruptcy-remote SPE to hold a company’s 
IP assets as part of what we term an “IP securitization.” As discussed 
below, an IP securitization is very similar to a traditional asset 
securitization.  
In a traditional asset securitization, a company, commonly referred to 
as the “originator,” sells receivables or other financial assets in a “true 
sale” to a bankruptcy-remote SPE, which issues securities to raise the 
funds required to purchase the originator’s assets.42 The SPE’s investors 
look to the assets the SPE purchased from the originator to satisfy the 
SPE’s obligations under the securities it issued. The SPE typically is an 
entity established and, at least to some extent, controlled by the originator.  
In an asset securitization transaction, the originator in effect monetizes 
its assets, exchanging them for cash received from the SPE.43 Once the 
assets are sold in a true sale to the SPE, it is expected that the assets have 
been removed from what could become the originator’s bankruptcy estate; 
if so, the originator’s creditors cannot reach the transferred assets if the 
originator later seeks bankruptcy protection. To prevent the possibility that 
the originator will put the SPE itself into bankruptcy, the SPE’s 
organizational documents might require, for example, that the SPE have 
independent directors who have to consent to any bankruptcy filing. To 
reduce the risk that some third-party creditor will put the SPE into 
bankruptcy, the debt the SPE can incur is often limited, as is the business 
in which the SPE can engage.  
In reality, things are not quite as clear-cut as suggested here. Rather, 
there is always some lingering (albeit minimal) risk that a true sale will be 
 42. For more on securitization, see STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO 
THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION (2002). In reality, the first SPE will often transfer the 
originator’s assets to a second SPE, which will then issue securities to finance the purchase of the 
originator’s assets. For more on this two-tier structure, see SCHWARCZ, supra, § 3:2.2. Securitization 
poses a number of other questions regarding the appropriate form of the SPE (e.g., whether it should 
be a corporation, a limited liability company, a trust, etc.). Securitization also raises a number of tax 
and accounting issues. Such matters are beyond this Essay’s scope, although it should be noted that 
practioners have developed techniques and deal structures to address them. 
 43. A prominent example of a transaction in which IP assets were monetized is the so-called 
“Bowie bonds” deal. See Andrew Fraser, Bowie Rocking Wall Street; Investment: Entertainer Markets 
Bonds Tied to Music Royalties, Prudential Takes Them All, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM, Feb. 15, 
1997, at E3. 
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recharacterized as a secured loan or that the bankruptcy court will 
otherwise disregard the bankruptcy-remote status of the SPE, such as 
through a substantive consolidation that consolidates the SPE and the 
originator. The asset securitization structure, in other words, minimizes 
bankruptcy risk but cannot totally eliminate it.  
The general framework for an IP securitization is as follows. A 
company would transfer its IP assets in a true sale to one or more 
bankruptcy-remote SPEs (an “IP SPE”).44 The primary purpose of the IP 
SPE, as reflected in its organizational documents, would be to bring suits 
against potential infringers of the transferred IP assets and perhaps to 
license the IP to others. To finance the cost of litigation and of engaging in 
licensing transactions (e.g., hiring counsel), the IP SPE could issue 
securities. Alternatively, proceeds arising under licenses the IP SPE enters 
into could fund the IP SPE, or the originator could make capital 
contributions that finance the IP SPE. (It is important to note that although 
the IP securitization structure is not designed as a financing strategy as 
such, the originator may nonetheless retain a right to receive licensing fees 
that arise under any licenses the IP SPE enters into with third parties or 
receive fair value when it transfers assets to the IP SPE.45) As in all asset 
securitizations, precautions must be taken to ensure the bankruptcy-remote 
status of the IP SPE.46  
This, then, raises the most challenging hurdle for IP securitization—
namely, the corporate governance of the SPE. In a traditional asset 
securitization, the transferred assets are pre-existing receivables. The 
originator has no substantial ongoing interest in the assets themselves once 
they have been monetized, and the key task for the SPE is to service the 
receivables for its own account and the interest of the SPE’s investors. By 
contrast, an IP SPE must manage the IP assets, most notably by enforcing 
the IP assets against alleged infringers and possibly by engaging in 
transactions over the IP assets. Further, important constituencies of the 
originator, such as the employee-inventors/authors who created the IP 
 44. Although the separation of IP from the going concern of a business can raise a problem for 
trademarks because it can lead to the separation of the mark from the very things that embody the 
goodwill associated with the mark, the IP SPE we envision would include not only the trademarks but 
all of the IP of the business, including copyrights, patents, and other know how. As a result, the IP SPE 
will keep the trademark connected with these other components of the business needed to generate the 
goodwill.  
 45. The monetization of IP assets is already common, the best example being the “Bowie bonds” 
referred to supra note 43. 
 46. See, e.g., SCHWARCZ, supra note 42, at ch.3 (discussing strategies for ensuring that an SPE is 
bankruptcy remote). 
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assets initially, may have a continuing interest in ensuring that the IP is 
commercialized. More importantly still, the transferred assets may be key 
assets that remain important in running the originator’s business, unlike a 
stream of receivables that has already been monetized upon the initial 
transfer to the SPE. Accordingly, in an IP securitization, the originator 
may itself be a licensee of the transferred assets and may otherwise desire 
to continue to exert meaningful control over the IP SPE and its 
management of the IP assets. While it is not difficult to negotiate and 
structure governance arrangements over the IP SPE that accommodate an 
originator’s desire for ongoing control, such arrangements reintroduce a 
bankruptcy risk that jeopardizes the entire IP securitization structure. The 
more control the originator exerts over the IP SPE, and the more it appears 
as though the originator has an ongoing ownership interest in the 
transferred assets, the greater is the risk that a bankruptcy court will 
determine that the IP SPE is not bankruptcy remote and that the 
transferred IP assets are in fact part of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.  
Similar questions of control over the SPE arise in the context of a 
“whole company securitization” (i.e., the securitization of the current and 
future revenue stream of a company’s important operating assets, if not its 
entire business)47 and a “future flow securitization” (i.e., the securitization 
of future receivables that do not exist when the transaction closes and 
which therefore depend on the future operation of the originator’s 
business).48 The common denominator among whole company 
securitizations, future flow securitizations, and IP securitizations is that the 
key assets in the transaction must be managed effectively going forward to 
reduce business risks, to maximize cash flows, and to maintain the value 
of the transferred assets. In short, in these structures, as compared to 
 47. See, e.g., SCHWARCZ, supra note 42, at ch.9; STANDARD & POOR’S, FACING UP TO THE 
RATING CHALLENGES OF WHOLE COMPANY SECURITIZATIONS (2000); Claire A. Hill, Whole Business 
Securitization in Emerging Markets, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 521 (2002); Vinod Kothari, Whole 
Business Securitization: Secured Lending Repackaged?, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 537 (2002); 
Lynn M. LoPucki, A Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization, 47 VAND. L. REV. 741, 
756–57 (2004); Michael Gregory, IP Players Look at M&A, PRIVATE PLACEMENT LETTER, June 4, 
2001; Michael Gregory & Colleen M. O’Connor, UCC Employs Regional Origination, Snags First 
Retail Franchise Driven Private, PRIVATE PLACEMENT LETTER, Sept. 8, 2003; Marie Leone, The 
Whole Truth: Whole Company Securitization is Helping Non-Investment-Grade Companies Raise 
Capital and Recognize Intangible Assets on Their Balance Sheets, But Can It Overcome Its Checkered 
Past?, CFO.com (Apr. 15, 2004), at http://www.cfo.com/printable/article.cfm /3012345?f:options. 
 48. See, e.g., STANDARD & POOR’S NEW ASSETS 1998, FUTURE FLOW SECURITIZATIONS (1998); 
Thomas J. Gordon, Comment, Securitization of Executory Future Flows as Bankruptcy-Remote True 
Sales, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1317 (2000); Mark Raines & Gabrielle Wong, Aspects of Securitization of 
Future Cash Flows Under English and New York Law, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 453 (2002); 
Michael Gregory, IP Enters Next Wave of Development, PRIVATE PLACEMENT LETTER, Dec. 4, 2000. 
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traditional asset securitizations involving pre-existing receivables, the 
SPE’s corporate governance is especially important.  
The principal benefit of the IP securitization structure is not as a 
financing option for the originator, but that in separating the originator’s 
IP assets from the originator if it were to file bankruptcy, the IP 
securitization structure better ensures the proper enforcement of the IP 
rights and the commercialization of the assets.49 By insulating an 
originator’s IP assets from inclusion in its bankruptcy estate and by more 
clearly allocating control over the IP SPE, and thus the IP assets it holds, 
an IP securitization would mitigate the delay and coordination problems of 
bankruptcy. A properly-structured IP SPE will have the critical attribute 
that a holder of IP assets must have to ensure the value of the IP assets: the 
credible perception by market participants that the IP SPE can enjoin 
infringers of the IP assets and can transact over them. IP securitization, 
then, reduces bankruptcy risk with respect to the transferred IP assets. The 
IP SPE would continue to enforce the IP rights it holds, as those assets are 
kept outside the debtor’s bankruptcy estate. And the debtor, if a licensee of 
the IP SPE, as well as any third-party licensees of the IP SPE, would 
continue to have access to the IP rights without those assets being 
ensnared in the bankruptcy process.  
If the IP remained in the debtor’s bankruptcy estate, the value of the 
assets might decrease substantially as a result of the bankruptcy process; 
having kept the assets in the estate, therefore, could work to the detriment 
of all corporate constituencies, including the reorganized debtor if it 
emerges from Chapter 11, and could frustrate ex ante transacting over the 
IP with potential licensees. Transferring the IP assets to an IP SPE helps 
preserve the value of the assets; and the originator, including its creditors, 
benefits from any proceeds the originator receives in the sale of the IP 
assets, from any rights the originator has in the IP assets as a licensee, and 
 49. Precedent already exists for structures, such as we outline in this Essay, designed to keep a 
debtor’s IP assets out of bankruptcy. An IP licensee, for example, sometimes requires its licensor, 
particularly where the licensor is a new or financially-strapped company, to transfer the licensor’s IP 
to an SPE so that the licensor, if it later files bankruptcy, cannot reject the license as an executory 
contract. See, e.g., Richard M. Cieri & Michelle M. Morgan, Licensing Intellectual Property and 
Technology from the Financially-Troubled or Startup Company: Prebankruptcy Strategies to 
Minimize the Risk in a Licensee’s Intellectual Property and Technology Investment, 55 BUS. LAW. 
1649 (2000); Scott J. Lochner, Risk-Minimization Strategies in Licensing Intellectual Property from 
Entities That Are, or Might Become, Financially Troubled, 14 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 7 (2002). In such 
instances, the licensee contracts with the bankruptcy-remote SPE and not the original IP owner (i.e., 
the future debtor). A licensor, of course, could adopt the same strategy by having its licensee establish 
an SPE that contracts with the licensor to mitigate the risk that the licensee, if it later files bankruptcy, 
will reject the license as an executory contract. What have been overlooked are the more general issues 
of control and the resulting commercialization benefits of an IP securitization.  
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from any income the originator receives under any licenses the IP SPE 
enters into with third parties.50 Indeed, by reducing the bankruptcy risk 
faced by third-party licensees, the IP securitization structure can promote 
IP-related transactions and, accordingly, increase cash flows to the 
originator both before and after bankruptcy. 
We recognize that the debtor-in-possession or bankruptcy trustee has 
wide discretion to act in the ordinary course of the debtor’s business in 
bankruptcy. However, there is still the risk that the debtor’s IP assets will 
get tangled up in the administration of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate. The 
risk does not need to be great for companies and their advisors to turn to 
options for mitigating it. At the very least, as outlined above, there could 
be delays in enforcing the debtor’s IP rights against putative infringers, as 
well as disputes over whether and on what terms to license the IP. Indeed, 
if the debtor’s IP constitutes a substantial portion of the estate, there is at 
least an argument that entering into licensing arrangements or suing for 
infringement might fall outside the scope of the debtor’s ordinary 
business, in which case creditor notice or bankruptcy court approval could 
be required.51 Plus, as noted earlier, third-party licensees of IP would 
prefer if the licensed IP were never part of a debtor’s bankruptcy estate.  
The bottom line point is that IP securitization reduces whatever risk is 
associated with the debtor’s IP assets being part of the debtor’s bankruptcy 
estate, just as traditional asset securitization reduces the bankruptcy risk 
associated with secured debt.52 The marginal reduction of bankruptcy risk 
is important. 
Whatever the merits are of IP securitization, there are at least two 
sources of market resistance that the structure would have to overcome to 
be implemented in practice. First, the IP securitization structure is untested 
in bankruptcy. The risk that a bankruptcy court, sitting in equity, will 
disregard the bankruptcy-remote status of the IP SPE jeopardizes the 
soundness of the entire structure. As compared to a traditional 
securitization of receivables, a bankruptcy court is more likely to disregard 
 50. In any case, as among the group that includes the debtor and each of its corporate 
constituencies, some are better off and none are worse off.  
 51. For the same reasons as those discussed above, see supra notes 30–34 and accompanying 
text, it would be useful to move beyond casual empiricism to conduct more rigorous empirical 
research to determine more accurately how frequently, and under what circumstances, disputes arise 
over whether the efforts of a debtor-in-possession or trustee-in-bankruptcy to enforce or transact over 
IP rights falls within the scope of the ordinary course of business. 
 52. Similarly, as noted above, notwithstanding the protections that § 365(n) of the Bankruptcy 
Code provide to licensees of IP assets, many licensees nonetheless negotiate for their licensor to 
transfer the assets into a bankruptcy-remote SPE to reduce the risk that the debtor-licensor will reject 
the license as an executory contract. See supra note 49. 
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an IP SPE’s bankruptcy-remote status and to substantively consolidate it 
and the originator because of the degree of control the originator is likely 
to exert over the SPE and because the contested IP assets, particularly if 
used in running the business, may be key to the originator’s reorganization 
in a way that a stream of receivables is not. To avoid such legal 
uncertainty, parties may simply steer clear of such transactions.53  
The LTV Steel case drives home the problem of legal uncertainty in this 
context.54 In December of 2000, LTV Steel Company (“LTV”) filed for 
relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and in so doing, 
challenged the structure of two asset securitizations in which it had 
engaged, arguing that the transactions should be characterized as secured 
loans and not true sales.55 LTV sought to haul back into its bankruptcy 
estate the assets it had transferred to two SPEs.56 In particular, LTV sought 
to use the assets as cash collateral.57 The LTV Steel court cast significant 
doubt on the bankruptcy-remote status of the SPEs, holding that LTV “has 
at least some equitable interest” in the SPEs’ assets and “that this interest 
is property of [LTV’s] estate.”58 The court went on to say that the “entry of 
the interim order [allowing LTV to use the assets as cash collateral] was 
necessary to enable [LTV] to keep its doors open and continue to meet its 
obligations to its employees, retirees, customers and creditors.”59  
The second hurdle for the IP securitization structure to overcome to 
achieve acceptance in business and finance circles is the stigma left by 
Enron’s collapse. SPEs have earned a bad name among some as a result of 
Enron’s use of the vehicles to inflate earnings and shed debt from its 
balance sheet.60 In the post-Enron era, companies, along with their 
financial advisors, accountants, and legal counsel, may tend to resist the 
use of new types of SPEs in corporate structures.  
 53. Notably, Delaware has attempted to mitigate the legal risk surrounding securitizations by 
adopting the “Asset-Backed Securities Facilitation Act,” which, by characterizing what constitutes a 
true sale under Delaware law, attempts to shore up an SPE’s standing as a bankruptcy-remote entity. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2701A–2703A (Supp. 2004); see also SCHWARCZ, supra note 42, at § 4:12. 
 54. In re LTV Steel Co., Inc., 274 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001). 
 55. Id. at 280–81, 285. 
 56. The assets at issue included inventory and receivables that LTV had transferred. Id. at 280. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 285. 
 59. Id. at 286. In the case of an IP SPE, the first issue is likely to obtain, although the second 
issue can probably be avoided since the originator will presumably enjoy a license.  
 60. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities 
in Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309 (2002) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Enron]; Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539 (2004) [hereinafter Schwarcz, 
Securitization]. 
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Even after Enron fades from memory, as it inevitably will, the use of 
the IP securitization structure will depend on the willingness of various 
parties to step up as early movers in structuring and entering into such 
deals. Lawyers, bankers, investors, and CFOs are often more comfortable 
following instead of leading when it comes to innovative new structures 
because of the attendant risks.61 That having been said, if there is enough 
money to be made, path dependence and risk aversion can be overcome. 
After all, somebody was first when it came to the securitization of 
receivables, leveraged buyouts, junk bonds, swaps, contingent convertible 
bonds, and so on.  
Outlining, as we have, why the IP securitization structure is a viable 
alternative for mitigating bankruptcy risk and facilitating the 
commercialization of IP, however, is not the end of the story. IP 
securitization, like traditional asset securitization, raises a concern that 
should be addressed in evaluating this structure—namely, the implications 
of the IP securitization structure for legal liability, a topic to which we 
now turn. 
III. ON BANKRUPTCY, LIMITED LIABILITY, AND JUDGMENT PROOFING 
The overarching purpose of bankruptcy is to maximize the asset pool to 
which creditors can turn and to ensure that the debtor, if it so chooses, is 
able to continue as a going concern. To this end, a bankruptcy filing 
triggers the creation of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate and the automatic 
stay, which keeps creditors from rushing to grab assets so that the debtor 
can be liquidated under Chapter 7 or reorganized under Chapter 11 in a 
more orderly and coordinated fashion. Once a company is in bankruptcy, 
there is often a search for assets that, although at first blush appear to fall 
outside the debtor’s bankruptcy estate, might be included in it to satisfy 
creditor claims or to facilitate the debtor’s emergence from Chapter 11 as a 
viable company. The avoidance of preferences and bans on fraudulent 
conveyances are examples. More controversial ways to enlarge the 
 61. For more on path dependency, boilerplate, and standardized contracting in the corporate 
setting, see generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in 
Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu 
Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 
EMORY L.J. 929 (2004); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate 
Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347 (1996); 
Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or 
“The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997); Michael Klausner, Corporations, 
Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995). 
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debtor’s bankruptcy estate by vitiating the corporate form itself include 
piercing the corporate veil to reach the assets of the debtor’s shareholders 
and other doctrines and judicial approaches, such as substantive 
consolidation, that in effect unwind or collapse corporate structures.62 
More to the point, observers have worried that the combination of 
limited shareholder liability63 and so-called “judgment-proofing” 
transactions will spell the demise of legal liability.64 The particular 
concern with limited liability is that it creates an incentive for corporations 
to take excessive risks because the downside the corporation and its 
shareholders face is capped. Limited liability can also have distributional 
consequences in that certain creditors may be left holding unsatisfied 
claims. The concern heightens when corporations can engage in judgment-
proofing transactions designed to take advantage of limited shareholder 
liability and the law’s respect for corporate structures in order to separate 
 62. For a good summary, see, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Collapsing Corporate Structures: 
Resolving the Tension Between Form and Substance, 60 BUS. LAW. 109 (2004). 
 63. For more on limited liability, see, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited 
Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 105–06 (1985); Timothy P. Glynn, Beyond 
“Unlimiting” Shareholder Liability: Vicarious Tort Liability for Corporate Officers, 57 VAND. L. 
REV. 329 (2004); Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets 
Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387 (1992); Paul Halpern et al., An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability 
in Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117 (1980); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward 
Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991); David W. Leebron, 
Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565 (1991); Henry G. Manne, Our 
Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 261–65 (1967); Robert B. 
Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate Participants for 
Torts of the Enterprise, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1994). 
 Our focus is on corporations; however, limited partners in a limited partnership and members in a 
limited liability company also enjoy the benefits of limited liability. Therefore, concerns about the 
death of legal liability would extend to these business associations as well.  
 64. For a sampling of the literature on judgment proofing, on which this Essay’s discussion of 
the subject builds, see, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1 (1996) 
[hereinafter LoPucki, Death of Liability]; Lynn M. LoPucki, The Essential Structure of Judgment 
Proofing, 51 STAN. L. REV. 147 (1998) [hereinafter LoPucki, Essential Structure]; Lynn M. LoPucki, 
The Irrefutable Logic of Judgment Proofing: A Reply to Professor Schwarcz, 52 STAN. L. REV. 55 
(1999) [hereinafter LoPucki, Irrefutable Logic]; Lynn M. LoPucki, Virtual Judgment Proofing: A 
Rejoinder, 107 YALE L.J. 1413 (1998) [hereinafter LoPucki, Virtual Judgment Proofing]; Charles W. 
Mooney, Jr., Judgment Proofing, Bankruptcy Policy, and the Dark Side of Tort Liability, 52 STAN. L. 
REV. 73 (1999); Steven L. Schwarcz, Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder, 52 STAN. L. REV. 77 (1999) 
[hereinafter Schwarcz, Rejoinder]; Steven L. Schwarcz, The Inherent Irrationality of Judgment 
Proofing, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Inherent Irrationality]; Steven Shavell, 
The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. OF L. & ECON. 45 (1986) [hereinafter Shavell, Judgment 
Proof Problem]; James J. White, Corporate Judgment Proofing: A Response to Lynn LoPucki’s The 
Death of Liability, 107 YALE L.J. 1363 (1998); Steven Shavell, Minimum Asset Requirements and 
Compulsory Liability Insurance as Solutions to the Judgment-Proof Problem (Harvard, John M. Olin 
Discussion Paper No. 456, 2004), at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/ 
456.pdf [hereinafter Shavell, Minimum Asset Requirements].  
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an enterprise’s assets from its liabilities.65 Representative judgment-
proofing strategies include sale-leasebacks, doing business through 
subsidiaries, franchising, off-shore asset sequestration, secured debt, and 
traditional asset securitization.66 The IP securitization structure would be 
another. 
There is a longstanding debate among academics over limited liability 
and whether or not legal liability should be shored up.67 An exhaustive 
 65. See LoPucki, Death of Liability, supra note 64. 
 66. For a good overview of how these techniques can judgment proof a corporation, see, e.g., 
LoPucki, Essential Structure, supra note 64, at 151–53.  
 67. For example, LoPucki considers a number of “radical” (his word) recommendations to stave 
off liability’s death, including holding shareholders personally liable, giving involuntary creditors 
priority over secured creditors, expanding enterprise liability, holding those who transfer assets to a 
judgment-proof corporation liable, and extending liability to the debtor’s trading partners who do 
business with the company. LoPucki, Death of Liability, supra note 64, at 54–71. For another 
important article arguing for expanded shareholder liability, see Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 
63. But see Grundfest, supra note 63 (arguing that imposing additional liability on shareholders will 
simply increase transaction costs on both issuers and investors as capital markets design strategies to 
“readily arbitrage around” the price effects of expanded liability on shares). For an argument in favor 
of officer liability, at least with respect to a corporation’s tort liabilities, see Glynn, supra note 63. 
 Others who have trained their sights more squarely on secured debt, such as Professors Bebchuk 
and Fried, as well as Professor Warren, have argued that some collateral should be preserved for 
unsecured creditors. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the 
Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse 
M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a 
Reply to Critics, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1279 (1997) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Fried, Further Thoughts]; 
Elizabeth Warren, An Article 9 Set-Aside for Unsecured Creditors, 51 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 323 
(1997). For one thoroughgoing response, see Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of 
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 DUKE L.J. 425 (1997).  
 Generally, it is far from certain that supposedly judgment-proofing transactions in fact render 
companies judgment proof. Schwarcz, for example, has explained that at least in an arm’s-length 
transaction, the transferor in the deal has an incentive to get fair value in exchange for the assets it 
gives up. See, e.g., Schwarcz, Inherent Irrationality, supra note 64; Schwarcz, Rejoinder, supra note 
64. But see LoPucki, Irrefutable Logic, supra note 64. In this view, it is only when and if the value 
received is paid out to shareholders that judgment proofing might occur. 
 Moreover, in considering whether or not judgment proofing is a problem, a comparison is worth 
noting. The concern with judgment proofing is that corporations, through a wide variety of familiar 
techniques, can place assets beyond the grasp of creditors in bankruptcy. But are judgment-proofing 
arrangements different in kind from a host of other ordinary-course transactions that dedicate or 
expend corporate assets in favor of particular corporate interests? For example, even when a company 
borrows on an unsecured basis, it commits to paying the lender principal and interest, and also is likely 
to agree to a host of affirmative and negative loan covenants that, ex post, can reduce firm value and 
cash flows. Indeed, the higher interest rate obligations associated with unsecured lending can 
themselves accelerate a company’s financial decline. Consider, further, long-term contracts that a 
company enters into with its suppliers or wage and benefit commitments management makes to 
employees, particularly to unionized workforces. The obvious retort is that each of these transactions 
maximizes firm value ex ante. However, the same can be said for judgment-proofing transactions. 
Even though judgment-proofing strategies might shrink the pool of assets available to certain creditors 
after the fact in bankruptcy, they can create more efficient and lower-cost financing options and 
corporate structures that expand the size of the corporate pie ex ante for all constituencies. Plus, if 
managers can freely sell corporate assets in the ordinary course of business and, with few restrictions, 
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consideration of limited shareholder liability and judgment proofing is 
beyond our present scope. We would, however, like to highlight a few 
points in the debate that we think cut against concerns that IP 
securitization might accelerate the death of legal liability. Because this is 
well-trodden ground, we will be brief and will paint with a broad brush.  
First and foremost, many creditors are compensated up front for the 
risk they bear in extending credit to a corporation. Lenders, for example, 
can adjust their credit terms to deal with riskier borrowers by increasing 
the credit’s interest rate and negotiating tighter covenants. By bringing 
their own expertise to bear and by engaging sophisticated counsel and 
financial advisors, lenders have an opportunity to ensure that they 
appropriately price the risk they assume when extending credit. Beyond 
that, lenders often are able to diversify and hedge.  
We do not want to overstate the virtues of such creditor self-help, 
however. Because of imperfect information, transaction costs, bounded 
rationality, and cognitive biases, creditors may not adjust appropriately a 
borrower’s credit terms in every case.68  
Tort creditors in particular have no meaningful opportunity to negotiate 
credit terms. Accordingly, when considering limited liability and judgment 
proofing, attention tends to focus on tort victims. Yet, special focus on tort 
victims is at least somewhat misplaced. To some extent, tort victims have 
an opportunity to price risk and buy insurance, which is to say that many 
tort victims are somewhat akin to voluntary creditors insofar as they suffer 
harm as a result of a product or service they actually purchase. Especially 
with the Internet, consumers can research goods and services, as well as 
manufacturers, and when deciding what to buy and who to do business 
with, can price in relevant consumer safety information to the extent it is 
available and understandable. Further, businesses have an incentive to 
modify their products and services by taking consumer preferences into 
account in providing safer goods. So long as market failures, including the 
bounded rationality and cognitive biases of consumers, do not undercut 
such market pressures, the need for legal liability is diminished.  
Second, limited liability is often looked at from a “micro” perspective 
that emphasizes a debtor’s incentive to externalize risk by engaging in 
excessively risky conduct. A “macro” perspective, on the other hand, 
distribute corporate assets to shareholders through dividends or stock buybacks, should corporations 
face legal constraints that restrict them from taking less extreme steps, such as encumbering or 
securitizing assets? 
 68. For more on so-called “nonadjusting” creditors, see, e.g., Bebchuk & Fried, Further 
Thoughts, supra note 67, at 1295–1314. 
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looks at limited liability as part of broader economic policy. From this 
vantage point, the problem with creditor protectionism policies rooted in 
extending legal liability, let alone more substantive regulation of business 
conduct, is that such policies risk compromising economic growth and 
may even accelerate the demise of struggling companies by restricting 
sources of capital.69  
For example, the risk of tort liability can chill the kind of innovation, 
risk-taking, and entrepreneurialism on which the U.S. economy depends 
and can otherwise “tax” economic activity.70 Expanding legal liability, 
whether it is by reaching the personal assets of shareholders or 
disregarding corporate structures, could have an in terrorem effect in 
chilling economically beneficial behavior. Because it is hard to price 
regulatory and legal uncertainty, companies might reasonably respond by 
being overly cautious, in effect internalizing too much risk.  
Furthermore, regulatory and judicial restrictions on financial 
arrangements and corporate structures can limit the pool of capital, drive 
up the cost of capital, and lead to operational inefficiencies. The complex 
and diverse capital and corporate structures of companies evidence the 
importance of private ordering to how businesses are financed and run. 
One way to respect such private ordering is to treat bankruptcy law as a 
default regime that companies can expressly contract around or at least 
structure around through techniques such as IP securitization.71  
 69. See Schwarcz, supra note 67, at 431–32 (explaining that the “availability of secured credit 
provides liquidity, which reduces the chance of debtor bankruptcy and thereby increases the expected 
value of unsecured claims”). 
 70. Cf. Grundfest, supra note 63, at 424 (explaining that limited shareholder liability may be a 
“necessary evil”). One study shows that direct tort costs in the United States totaled approximately 
$246 billion, or over 2.2% of GDP, in 2003. See TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, U.S. TORT COSTS: 
2004 UPDATE, TRENDS AND FINDINGS ON THE COSTS OF THE U.S. TORT SYSTEM (2004) (defining tort 
costs to include benefits paid or expected to be paid to third parties (i.e., losses), defense costs, and 
administrative expenses). Based on 2000 figures, the Council of Economic Advisors estimated that 
“excessive” tort costs—roughly speaking, direct tort costs minus actual economic damages, actual 
non-economic damages, and reasonable costs to administer the tort system—imposed a cost on the 
U.S. economy that was in the range of a 2% tax on consumption, a 3% tax on wages, or a 5% tax on 
capital income. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, WHO PAYS FOR TORT LIABILITY CLAIMS: AN 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM (2002).  
 71. Prepackaged bankruptcies are another option for contracting around bankruptcy law. For 
more on prepackaged bankruptcies, see, e.g., Baird & Rasmussen, Chapter 11, supra note 1; Baird & 
Rasmussen, Control Rights, supra note 1; Baird & Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, supra note 1; 
LoPucki, supra note 1. 
 A number of leading bankruptcy scholars, including Elizabeth Warren, Lucian Bebchuk, Barry 
Adler, Robert Rasmussen, Alan Schwartz, and Lynn LoPucki, have analyzed the extent to which 
parties should be allowed to contract around bankruptcy law. A broad inquiry into the extent to which 
bankruptcy law should be optional or immutable is beyond our present scope. For a recent article that 
provides an excellent discussion of the issue and a useful overview, see Elizabeth Warren & Jay 
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The third point concerns a link between the theory of the firm and 
corporate governance, on the one hand, and limited shareholder liability, 
on the other. It has been argued that if shareholders faced greater liability, 
they would want greater control over the business.72 This could undercut 
capital formation. It would be harder for founders of businesses who are 
reluctant to relinquish control to raise capital. Plus, shareholders may not 
have the expertise needed to run the business. In addition, in many 
instances, would-be shareholders would simply search for other 
investment opportunities that allow them to be more passive, limiting the 
funds that are put to work as equity. More subtly, in competing to raise 
funds, managers and entrepreneurs might respond by committing to 
strategies that reduce shareholder risk and therefore the need for 
shareholder monitoring and control; but in doing so, they may bond 
themselves to overly cautious business strategies.73  
Finally, important law and judicial doctrines presently shore up legal 
liability. These include bans on fraudulent conveyances, the doctrine of 
substantive consolidation, prohibitions on preferences, veil piercing, 
director and officer fiduciary duties in the zone of insolvency, and 
enterprise liability.74 Market pressures can also cabin risky conduct as 
companies have an incentive to provide safe goods that consumers 
demand.75 Further, the agency problems that corporate governance 
addesses may mitigate risky corporate conduct if, as many claim, 
managers are risk averse in how they run the enterprise to protect their 
Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
1197 (2005).  
 72. See, e.g., Leebron, supra note 63, at 1587 (“Some justifications for limited liability have 
focused on the modern corporation and the separation of ownership and control. The argument is that 
no investor would accept unlimited liability when the actual management of the risk is in the hands of 
others.”); Manne, supra note 63, at 261–65 (stressing the efficiency of the specialization of function 
that characterizes the corporate form and its dependence on limited shareholder liability). 
 73. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 63, at 94–95 (discussing managerial bonding 
strategies in response to expanded shareholder liability). A different question is, why stop with 
shareholders if the decision is to extend liability? Why not look to other corporate constituencies that 
make up the firm to satisfy its obligations, at least under certain circumstances? Why allow some 
members of the production team to escape liability if shareholders do not? After all, all corporate 
constituencies enjoy limited liability, not just shareholders. Stephen Bainbridge has raised similar 
questions. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 498–99 (2001).  
 74. See generally Schwarcz, Inherent Irrationality, supra note 64, at 32–48. 
 75. See, e.g., LoPucki, Death of Liability, supra note 64, at 52–54 (discussing the roles of culture 
and politics in constraining judgment proofing); W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive 
Damages Against Corporations in Environmental and Safety Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285, 315–17 (1998) 
[hereinafter Viscusi, Social Costs] (discussing how market forces promote safety); W. Kip Viscusi, 
Toward A Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social Insurance, Government Regulation, and 
Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 65, 67–68 (1989) [hereinafter Viscusi, 
Toward a Diminished Role] (discussing the role of consumer preferences and markets). 
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firm-specific human capital.76 Plus, managers might internalize an 
altruistic concern for others—sometimes called an “other-regarding 
preference”—that creates personal distaste for risky conduct that 
jeopardizes others’ well-being, even if taking more risk would be good for 
firm performance.77  
Concerns over too little legal liability, in other words, may be 
overstated. If liability does need further shoring up, a number of options 
exist, other than extending legal liability to additional parties or 
disregarding corporate structures.78 Three such options that have been 
offered include minimum capitalization requirements for firms, mandatory 
insurance for companies, and more stringent product safety regulation. 
Although these options have their own problems, they do have the 
advantage of mitigating many of the distortions and inefficiencies rooted 
in the uncertainty that would likely result if legal liability were extended 
through the judicial process, particularly if done so by courts cobbling 
together doctrines from corporate law, commercial law, bankruptcy law, 
and tort law to create a mix-and-match liability regime.79  
 76. The CEO and other top executives, for example, may be risk averse in some instances to 
avoid jeopardizing their positions if the company were to land in bankruptcy. See Easterbrook & 
Fischel, supra note 63, at 107 (explaining that the “possibility of bankruptcy also represents a real cost 
to those with firm-specific investments in human capital”); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 63, at 
1908 (explaining that managers “may manage in a risk-averse manner in order to lower the 
probability” of losses that “threaten their jobs” and thus may be “overdeterred by unlimited liability”); 
Leebron, supra note 63, at 1590 (“Managers will generally have less incentive that shareholders to 
increase the riskiness of the firm, since their human capital is typically heavily invested in the firm and 
might be severely damaged by the firm’s bankruptcy.”). Furthermore, shareholders generally do not 
suffer any reputational sanction when a company in which they hold shares receives bad publicity. 
Shareholders can simply sell and move on. The reputations of senior executives, however, do suffer. 
Thus, managers face a unique cost that shareholders do not bear.  
 77. See generally Lynn A. Stout, Other-Regarding Preferences and Social Norms (Georgetown 
Law & Econ. Res. Paper No. 265902, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=265902. 
 78. See generally Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can’t Do Well: The Jury’s 
Performance as a Risk Manager, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 901 (1998); Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive 
Damages: Should Juries Decide?, 82 TEX. L. REV. 381 (2003) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE (2002)); Shavell, Judgment Proof Problem, supra note 64; 
Viscusi, Social Costs, supra note 75; Viscusi, Toward A Diminished Role, supra note 75; Shavell, 
Minimum Asset Requirements, supra note 64. 
 79. See generally Kieff & Paredes, supra note 18. A more fundamental concern with extending 
legal liability through the courts is that juries and judges evaluate risk with the benefit of hindsight. As 
Judge Easterbrook put it when asking in Carroll v. Otis Elevator Co. why the design of an escalator, 
which allegedly injured the plaintiff in the case, should be a question for juries: “Come the lawsuit . . . 
the passenger injured by a stop presents himself as a person, not a probability.” Carroll v. Otis Elevator 
Co., 896 F.2d 210, 215 (1990) (cited and discussed in W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A 
Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 563–64 (2000)). Moreover, juries and judges are not asked to account 
for the downstream incentive effects of imposing liability in a particular case. For more on juries, see, 
e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE (2002); Hastie & Viscusi, 
supra note 78; Sharkey, supra note 78; Viscusi, Social Costs, supra note 75; Viscusi, Toward a 
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In sum, the costs of greater creditor protectionism may outweigh its 
benefits. To be sure, it might be nice if no creditor were left holding the 
bag when a corporation failed. But striving toward this end by shoring up 
legal liability in favor of creditors has its own costs. Limiting the liability 
of shareholders, as well as affording enterprises flexibility in structuring 
their operations and in innovating new capital structures, can maximize 
firm value ex ante, even if it means that certain creditors—including more 
sympathetic tort creditors—may be left with unsatisfied claims ex post. 
Further, when it comes to IP assets in particular, IP securitization might 
actually increase the size of the corporate pie available to all corporate 
constituencies.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Essay explores important interfaces shared by IP law, bankruptcy 
law, and corporate law. The consequences of corporate law and 
bankruptcy law for IP are particularly important because of IP’s special 
role in the economy when it comes to new businesses and productivity 
growth. To mitigate the risk that the bankruptcy process will ensnare a 
debtor’s IP assets, we offer a framework for IP securitization. The IP 
securitization structure predetermines who has control over a company’s 
IP assets if the company later enters bankruptcy. In other words, questions 
of corporate control over the IP assets are not left to the Bankruptcy Code 
or even to the bargaining process resulting in prepackaged bankruptcies. 
The possibility of allocating control through securitization helps preserve 
for the originator and potential third-party licensees the value of the 
originator’s IP assets by keeping them out of the originator’s bankruptcy 
estate and better enables an enterprise and its counterparties to decide for 
themselves on what terms to engage in business and finance without 
having their arrangements subject to the bankruptcy process. The greater 
certainty and predictability that arises when the legal system allows parties 
to privately order their affairs encourages business dealings in the first 
place, a point which is not limited to IP. If the deals that parties strike are 
enforced in bankruptcy, bankruptcy law can better facilitate business 
Diminished Role, supra note 75.  
 Whatever their flaws, legislators and regulators are better equipped to take a broader perspective 
that views legal liability, risk management, and the tort system as part of economic policy generally. 
See Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 78, at 902 (explaining that risk management policy “requires an 
omnibus consideration of the distribution of cases, probabilities, benefits, and costs. In contrast, the 
tort jury trial focuses on a single case, sampled from only one of the four cells of a hypothetical risk 
analysis matrix: the too-few-precautions, harmful outcome cell.”). 
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relationships and the creation of wealth ex ante, instead of primarily 
serving as a means of winding up or reorganizing a firm ex post after a 
bankruptcy filing.  
To be sure, IP securitization comes at some cost, at least insofar as a 
company’s creditors might be forced to shoulder additional risks and 
harms that are uncompensated. When crafting the rules of the game, 
lawmakers are challenged to strike balances in order to maximize social 
welfare, while ensuring that no particular group shoulders a 
disproportionate burden of the costs. Well-intentioned individuals, for 
example, can in good faith disagree over how to balance the harms that 
befall tort victims, on the one hand, and the importance of business and 
financial innovation, on the other. In making these tradeoffs, though, it is 
important to consider both sides of the ledger. It is also important to avoid 
falling into the trap where the perfect becomes the enemy of the good.80 In 
a world of scarcity, it is simply unavoidable that each person will in some 
way be called on to subsidize larger social goals. Whether there should be 
more or less legal liability, or more or less judgment proofing, is 
ultimately a matter of comparative institutional analysis, to which we hope 
this Essay has contributed. 
 80. FRANCOIS MARIE AROUET VOLTAIRE, DICTIONNAIRE PHILOSOPHIQUE (“Le mieux est 
l’ennemi du bien”). 
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